Fatwah mandating the bloodshed of israelis everywhere

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He is subject to “Special Administrative Measures” (“SAMs”) restricting his ability to communicate with persons outside of the prison in which he is incarcerated so as to prevent him from continuing to lead terrorist organizations and their members. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by empaneling an anonymous jury in light of the particular allegations of criminal wrongdoing at issue, involving the corruption of the judicial process, and the widespread publicity about the case. Transcript of Conversation between Ahmed Abdel Sattar and Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa, Sep. They argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their conviction on either count, and contend that their conduct was constitutionally protected in any event. History of the Charges By way of background, the initial indictment charged all three defendants with violating 18 U. The discussion goes well beyond the abstract and contemplates the coordination with Atia of violent actions, presumably along the lines of the Luxor massacre. Unlike the application of section 2339B proposed in the initial indictment, the superseding indictment required the jury to find that the defendants knew or intended the criminal uses to which the conspiracy would put the material support they provided, thereby eliminating concerns about inadequate notice.

Rahman is serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison for terrorism-related crimes of seditious conspiracy, solicitation of murder, solicitation of an attack on American military installations, conspiracy to murder, and a conspiracy to bomb. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sever the trial of Stewart and Yousry from that of Sattar in light of the general preference for joint trials, the specific charges at issue here, and the district court's curative instructions. I also demand that they consider themselves absolved from it. A review of the transcripts of various intercepted telephone conversations introduced into evidence, particularly the September 18, 2000, conversation involving Sattar, Taha, and another party, bolsters this conclusion. We are satisfied that section 2339A's knowledge-or-intent formulation saves the statute from being unconstitutionally vague as applied here. They note that “personnel,” undefined at the relevant time, applies equally to sections 2339A and 2339B, compare id.

However, as a cleric and the group's leader, Abdel Rahman was entitled to dispense fatwas, religious opinions on the holiness of an act, to members of the group sanctioning proposed courses of conduct and advising them whether the acts would be in furtherance of jihad.[3]United States v. At about this time, defendant Sattar was in contact with members of al-Gama'a, who were divided over their support for what remained of the cease-fire. Williams does not apply to the conduct at issue here. (“FISA”); and in the denial of Stewart's motion for disclosure of whether she, her co-defendants, or others were subject to surveillance by the National Security Agency. For that reason and those set forth by the district court in its decisions addressing the matter, see Sattar V, 395 F. Count Two charged Sattar with conspiring to murder persons in a foreign country.

Indicative of this purpose, in a speech to his followers Abdel Rahman instructed that they were to “do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, with the missile ․ against God's enemies.” Abdel Rahman's role in the conspiracy was generally limited to overall supervision and direction of the membership, as he made efforts to remain a level above the details of individual operations. Prior to the visit, Stewart signed and delivered to the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York a document in which she affirmed, under penalty of perjury, that she would abide by the SAMs imposed by the Bureau of Prisons on Abdel Rahman. But unlike Stewart, the message Clark disseminated in apparent violation of the SAMs-that Abdel Rahman did not support the formation of a political party in Egypt-did not have the same potential for inciting violence. Sattar argues that the government's decision to file the superseding indictment and add the charge of violating section 956 “was a retaliatory act ․ motivated by the embarrassment [the government] suffered as a result of the dismissal” of two central counts in the original indictment. But the district court did not abuse its discretion in this respect. This is not a case where “the risk that the jury [would] not, or [could] not, follow instructions [was] so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system [could not] be ignored.” Bruton v.

Moreover, we reject both Stewart's argument that, as a lawyer, she was not bound by the SAMs, and her belated argument collaterally attacking their constitutionality. § 956, and his conviction of soliciting persons to commit crimes of violence-viz., murder and conspiracy to commit murder-in violation of 18 U. We therefore affirm the convictions in their entirety. We conclude that the district court committed neither procedural error in calculating the applicable Guidelines ranges, nor substantive error in varying from those ranges pursuant to its consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U. Because the district court declined to find whether Stewart committed perjury at trial, we cannot conclude that the mitigating factors found to support her sentence can reasonably bear the weight assigned to them. They brought with them another letter which included another message from Taha, again asking for Abdel Rahman's support for ending the cease-fire. We have no basis upon which to entertain a doubt as to the authority of the Attorney General of the United States to ensure that reasonable measures are designed and implemented in an attempt to prevent imprisoned criminals who are considered dangerous despite their incarceration from engaging in or facilitating further acts of criminality from their prison cells. He has demonstrated his willingness to engage in violent criminality not by acting violently himself, but by ordering, encouraging, and conspiring with others who would actually shed the blood. Resolution of this dispute does not turn on whether the prosecution introduced evidence of “pure speech.” “Numerous crimes under the federal criminal code are, or can be, committed by speech alone,” and certain crimes “are characteristically committed through speech.” Rahman, 189 F.3d at 117. For example, in reaffirming that he was withdrawing his support for the cease-fire, Abdel Rahman said that he had “expressed [his] opinion and left the matters to [his] brothers to examine it and study it.” Statement for Release, Abdel Rahman, June 20, 2000.

We affirm as to Sattar's conviction of conspiring to murder persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 U. This is so particularly in light of the seriousness of her criminal conduct, her responsibilities as a member of the bar, and her role as counsel for Abdel Rahman. But Jabara would not permit Abdel Rahman to dictate a letter to Yousry in response. The likelihood that he would continue to order, direct, or encourage such acts from prison, if he could, was plain, and his incapacitation reasonably required not just his physical immobility, but also his virtual silence visà-vis the world at large. The issue is, instead, whether Abdel Rahman's statements were protected speech. But a reasonable jury could have found, in light of Abdel Rahman's role as “spiritual” leader of al-Gama'a, that his messages were ultimately intended to sway al-Gama'a members to end the cease-fire, and by implication to commit criminal acts of violence.

To that end, several wrote messages addressed to Abdel Rahman, which they sent to Sattar for delivery to Abdel Rahman. Stewart argues that, at worst, she broke a promise, and that the statute criminalizes false statements, not false promises. On May 16, 2000, Stewart signed an affirmation stating that she would (“shall”) abide by the SAMs. A check “d[oes] not, in terms, make any representation as to the state of [the drawer's] bank balance” but “serve[s] only to direct the drawee banks to pay the face amounts to the bearer, while committing [the drawer] to make good the obligations if the banks dishonor [ ] the drafts.” Id. Based on her repeated affirmations, and her repeated violations of those affirmations, moreover, a reasonable jury could have concluded that at the time Stewart executed and submitted the affirmations at issue, she did not intend to abide by them-in other words, that her representations were knowingly false when made. Finally, the defendants argue that the district court erred in addressing post-conviction claims of juror misconduct. Selective Prosecution Stewart argues that she was selectively prosecuted on account of her gender and political beliefs in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. 1, 2004 (denying selective prosecution claim), Stewart's arguments in this regard are without merit. Vindictive Prosecution Sattar argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the Count-Two conspiracy charge in the superseding indictment because the institution of the charge was driven by prosecutorial vindictiveness. The government filed the original five-count indictment in April 2002. By opinion and order dated July 22, 2003, the district court agreed with Sattar. Most of the evidence against Sattar that Stewart and Yousry assert to have been unduly prejudicial to them-evidence submitted to establish the existence of the Count-Two conspiracy charge against Sattar-would have been admissible against Stewart and Yousry even had the trial been severed. “[T]he fact that testimony against a codefendant may be harmful is not a ground for severance if that testimony would also be admissible against the moving defendant tried separately.” United States v.

Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam), cert. Pro-cease-fire and anti-cease-fire factions developed, and members of the organization wanted Abdel Rahman to take a position on the matter. A reasonable jury could have concluded that Stewart's affirmations that she would abide by the SAMs amounted to factual assertions regarding her then-present intent to abide by the SAMs. The defendants also argue that the district court made various evidentiary errors. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Supp.2d at 103 (denying selective prosecution claim), cf. Supp.2d at 311-14 (denying vindictive prosecution claim), and Order, Sept. Sattar moved to dismiss these charges on the ground that section 2339B was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the allegations in the indictment. Following that decision, the government filed a superseding indictment adding a new count charging Sattar with conspiring to murder persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 U. Count Five charged Stewart and Yousry with providing and concealing material support to that conspiracy, and Count Four charged them with conspiring to provide and conceal that support. This is so because the Count-Two conspiracy was an element of the crimes charged against Stewart and Yousry in Counts Four and Five, and the government would have been entitled, and expected, to elicit relevant evidence regarding its existence.

To refute those reports, Sattar and Yousry asked one of Abdel Rahman's lawyers, former United States Attorney General Ramsey Clark, to tell a reporter for an Arabic-language newspaper that Abdel Rahman opposed al-Gama'a's formation of a political party. The May 16, 2000, statement reads in pertinent part: I ․ understand that neither I nor any member of my office shall forward any mail received from inmate Abdel Rahman to a third person. 7.) In the May 7, 2001, statement, Stewart affirmed: I ․ specifically understand that the meetings shall not be for the purpose of presenting statements to the defense team for further dissemination to third parties, including the media. 12.)A reasonable factfinder was entitled to conclude that Stewart affirmed under penalty of perjury that she had the then-present intent to have her actions conform to the terms of the SAMs. As directed by Abdel Rahman, Sattar informed various members of al-Gama'a that Abdel Rahman was willing to reconsider the effectiveness of the cease-fire and had rejected the associated idea that al-Gama'a should form a political party in Egypt. But some members of the media in the Middle East expressed skepticism about the veracity of Sattar's representations, questioning whether they in fact came from Abdel Rahman or whether Sattar had fabricated them himself. Stewart at least thrice affirmed “under the penalties of perjury the truth” of certain statements. First, they allege a variety of pretrial errors: in the denial of their motions to sever their trial from Sattar's; in the empaneling of an anonymous jury; in the denial of Stewart's motion to suppress certain evidence obtained pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. Yousry and Stewart then smuggled the responses out of FMC Rochester among their legal papers, and sent them to Sattar. Stewart and Yousry do not, presumably because they cannot, suggest that Congress did not have the power to criminalize the relevant underlying conduct. Counts Six and Seven Stewart challenges her convictions on Counts Six and Seven for violating the blanket provisions of 18 U. Before, after, and between executing these affirmations, she helped smuggle messages to and from Abdel Rahman in violation of the SAMs. The defendants also raise various challenges to the district court's case administration. Before: WALKER, CALABRESI, and SACK, Circuit Judges. We would be remiss if we did not, at the outset, commend the district court for its thoroughness, thoughtfulness, and effectiveness in the conduct of these unusually lengthy, difficult, and sensitive proceedings. We remand the case, however, with respect to the sentence of Stewart, and also with respect to the sentences of Yousry and Sattar in light of the resentencing of Stewart. § 371, by violating SAMs imposed upon Abdel Rahman. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain these convictions, especially in light of testimony establishing that Sattar attempted to undermine a unilateral cease-fire by an Egyptian terrorist organization and to draft a fatwa calling for, inter alia, the killing of “Jews and Crusaders.”We affirm as to Stewart's and Yousry's convictions of providing and concealing material support to the conspiracy to murder persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 U. We also agree with the district court's treatment of confidential information, including its denial of Stewart's motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), its ex parte, in camera examination of FISA wiretap applications, and its rejection of Stewart's more general challenges to the constitutionality of FISA. We nonetheless remand their cases to the district court to allow it to reconsider their sentences should it choose to do so in light of the resentencing of Stewart. Sattar expected Clark to make a public statement to similar effect, but Clark declined to do so. § 501.3(a) (setting forth the boundaries of that authority). § 2 by providing and concealing material support for the Count-Two conspiracy for which Sattar was convicted and their Count Four convictions for conspiracy to provide and conceal such support, in violation of 18 U. Abdel Rahman's instrumental participation-indeed, his leadership-would, as the district court observed, have been unavailable to the Count-Two conspiracy “without the active participation of Stewart and Yousry.” Sattar V, 395 F. The defendants argue that the government established only that they provided the underlying conspiracy with Abdel Rahman's “pure speech” and therefore did not provide “personnel” within any constitutional interpretation of section 2339A. “[I]f the evidence shows that the speeches crossed the line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to violate the laws, the prosecution is permissible.” Id. Words “that instruct, solicit, or persuade others to commit crimes of violence ․ violate the law and may be properly prosecuted regardless of whether they are uttered in private, or in a public speech, or in administering the duties of a religious ministry.” Id. The government cross-appeals from the defendants' sentences. We find no fault with the district court's resolution of allegations of juror impropriety. 20, 1999, at 6-7 (emphasis omitted, parenthetical in original). In light of such evidence, a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy as charged in Count Two existed.2. Stewart and Yousry also assert that they did not provide material support in the form of “personnel” to the Count-Two conspiracy. There was evidence introduced at trial sufficient to support a reasonable juror's inference that Stewart and Yousry helped Abdel Rahman participate covertly in the conspiracy to engage in violence abroad by communicating to members of al-Gama'a and others his withdrawal of support for the cease-fire. As we recognized when affirming Abdel Rahman's sentence, “freedom of speech and of religion do not extend so far as to bar prosecution of one who uses a public speech or a religious ministry to commit crimes.” Abdel Rahman, 189 F.3d at 116-17. In other words, if Stewart and Yousry knew that their actions provided material support to a conspiracy to end the cease-fire and thereby unloose deadly acts of terrorism by al-Gama'a and others, then they were on notice that what they were doing was prohibited by a statute that criminalizes the provision of material support “knowing or intending that [such support is] to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out,” criminal actions.

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